KARL  JASPERS  FORUM

TA 112 (Müller)

 

Commentary 4 (to R2)

 

 

( THEISM  AND  CONSTRUCTION )

by Richard Moodey

25 February 2009, posted 28 February 20009

 

 

HFJM [16] The recent discussions (for instance by Fisher and Moodey) about 'reification' (thing-ification) and 'construction' in embodiment are not clear to me, and I would appreciate explanation, concerning the metaphysics-ontology aspect :     whether or not the 'thing'-structures are meant to be mind-independently real  (see discussion above, especially the part concerning Strawson).    Despite this ontology-question-in-principle, neural models can be,  and are usually,  dealt with in mind-independent objective terms, and in discussing biology this as-if-objectivity often poses no problems for discussion, while in discussing 'mind' it always does.

 

The real alternative is :   imagined pre-structured subject-exclusive metaphysics    versus   active subject-inclusive   structuring.

 

MOODEY:  MY THEISTIC ANSWER IS, PRECISELY BECAUSE IT IS THEISTIC, NOT "PURELY" PHILOSOPHICAL (I AM SKEPTICAL ABOUT THE PERSUASIVENESS OF PHILOSOPHICAL PROOFS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD).  NEVERTHELESS, MY EXTRA-PHILOSOPHICAL BELIEF IN GOD INFLUENCES MY PHILOSOPHICAL POSITION.  BECAUSE I ATTRIBUTE "MIND" TO GOD, I DON'T THINK ANYTHING IS, ULTIMATELY, MIND INDEPENDENT.  CREATURES ARE CONTINGENT, AND THAT UPON WHICH THEY ARE CONTINGENCE HAS A MIND.  BUT IT DO HOLD THAT THERE ARE ALL SORTS OF THINGS THAT ARE NOT CONTINGENT UPON HUMAN MINDS.  I HOPE THIS CLARIFIES MY POSITION.

 

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Richard Moodey

     e-mail < MOODEY001 (at) gannon.edu >